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Democratic Deficit or the
Europeanisation of Secession?




This article deals with the variation in the demand for self-government in Scotland – as measured
by the vote in the two referendums – between 1979, when devolution was rejected, and 1997,
when devolution was endorsed. The existing literature mainly deals with each of the two refer-
endums in isolation and does not offer an explicitly comparative analysis of them. However,
implicit comparisons contained in analyses of the 1997 referendum tend to identify as the main
cause of the variation the ‘democratic deficit’ created by Conservative rule between 1979 and
1997, which was consistently rejected in Scotland. I take issue with this explanation on theoret-
ical and empirical grounds and advances an alternative account grounded in an explicit compar-
ison of the two referendums. Based on a rationalist approach, the analysis presented here identifies
three key elements in the voting dynamics at the two points in time – a gap between support for
self-government and the actual vote in the referendum; an interaction effect between attitudes to
devolution and to independence; and the role of the European context in shaping perceptions of
independence. I argue that significant change in these three variables (rather than a ‘democratic
deficit’) appear to have been the most important determinants of the different results of the two
referendums.
Scottish devolution is one of the most far-reaching changes in the British consti-
tution since the secession of southern Ireland in the 1920s.1 Despite its importance,
it has not attracted the level of scholarly interest, especially outside Scotland, that
it deserves. This is even more surprising since the dynamics of the demand for self-
government in Scotland present an intriguing puzzle for political science analysis.
On the one hand, public opinion was extraordinarily stable throughout the post-
war period, with support for home rule – as measured by opinion polls – consis-
tently above 60 percent.2 On the other, the two crucial moments of the post-war
history of devolution – the 1979 and 1997 referendums – produced starkly differ-
ent results: in 1979 devolution was rejected while in 1997 it was emphatically
endorsed.3 Analyses of the Scottish demand for self-government thus face a two-
fold task. First, to explain why devolution was rejected in the 1979 referendum
despite the fact that opinion polls suggest there was 60 percent support for self-
government and, second, to explain why devolution was endorsed in 1997 after
having been rejected in 1979. The present analysis is also informed by, and intends
to contribute to, the growing literature on the peculiarities of referendum voting
behaviour in comparison to parliamentary elections and, in particular, on explain-
ing referendum outcomes at odds with well-established patterns of public opinion
POLITICAL STUDIES:  2005 VOL 53,  320–342
© Political Studies Association, 2005.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT OR EUROPEANISATION OF SECESSION? 321
(for a summary see LeDuc, 2002). Of particular interest are referendums held on
similar questions at different points in time, such as those on Scottish devolution
and Quebec’s independence. Yet, while the latter have been subjected to compar-
ative analysis (Pammett and LeDuc, 2001) this has not yet been done in the 
Scottish case.
Existing studies of Scottish devolution deal with each of the two referendums in
isolation and as yet there is no explicitly comparative work addressing the puzzle
outlined above. This article does so by proposing a theoretical model able to explain
the puzzle and by presenting evidence supporting it. The model is centred on the
interaction between attitudes to devolution and attitudes to independence and on
the role of the European dimension in framing perceptions of independence. The
results indicate that the argument advanced here is able to take up the two-fold
task mentioned above and to provide a more robust explanation for the variation
between 1979 and 1997 than those currently advanced in the literature, in terms
of both theoretical coherence and empirical substantiation. The article proceeds as
follows. The first section reviews and provides a critique of the literature. The
second section introduces the theoretical and methodological framework of the
research. The third section presents the results of the analysis and the fourth section
concludes by discussing them in relation to the research questions and pointing to
the relevance of these findings for the scholarly debate on both Scottish devolu-
tion and referendum voting.
A Review and a Critique of the Literature
Though no explicitly comparative study of the two referendums has so far been
carried out and no comprehensive explanation for the difference in results has been
advanced, it is possible to identify three main explanatory accounts in the litera-
ture. The first is centred on the content of the two devolution packages as repre-
sented by the Scotland Act 1978 and the Scotland’s Parliament 1997 White Paper,
respectively. According to this thesis, the former was perceived as an overwhelm-
ingly partisan document intended to entrench Labour domination in Scotland
through an assembly elected by the first-past-the-post system. In contrast, the 1997
White Paper was the product of a wide consensus within Scottish society, symbol-
ised by the agreement on a proportional electoral system. The partisan nature of
devolution in 1979 produced a partisan pattern of voting whereby non-Labour pro-
devolutionists – notably Conservative identifiers – turned against the Scotland 
Act in the run up to the referendum. In contrast, the consensual nature of the
1997 proposals ensured a broad and steady support for devolution up to and at the
referendum (Balsom and McAllister, 1979, pp. 402–5; Mitchell, Denver, Pattie,
Bochel, 1998, p. 168).
The second explanation focuses on the degree of unity and the popularity of the
Labour party and the effectiveness of the pro-devolution referendum campaign. It
points out that Labour was divided and deeply unpopular in 1979 and that the Yes
campaign was divided and underfunded relative to their opponents.4 In contrast
the Labour party was united and at the peak of its popularity in September 1997,
the Yes campaign was also united and it enjoyed higher financial resources 
than the No side.5 These differences determined that in 1979 Labour’s unpopu-
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larity and the ineffective campaign undermined support for devolution while in
1997 the situation was reversed.
The third, and currently most influential, argument focuses on the role of the so-
called ‘democratic deficit’ created by 18 years of Conservative rule at the UK level
that was consistently rejected in Scotland. According to this theory, demand for
self-government was ‘soft’ in the 1970s and was thus easily defeated by the Con-
servative policy of supporting devolution in principle but opposing the Scotland
Act 1978 in practice (Bochel and Denver, 1981, p. 144; Brand, 1986, p. 38). In
contrast, the 1979–1997 ‘democratic deficit’ had transformed home rule into the
‘settled will of the Scottish people’, which was reflected in a very stable public
support for devolution.6 Different authors account for this either in terms of a con-
vergence of the ‘class’ and ‘identity’ cleavages or as the ‘mobilisation of the middle
classes’.7 In all these accounts, the connection between attitudes to devolution and
attitudes to independence is almost totally neglected while the European dimen-
sion receives some attention but is not analysed in detail (Brown, McCrone, 
Paterson, 1998, pp. 64–5).
While most of these explanations certainly point to important factors in the
dynamic of the demand for devolution in Scotland between 1979 and 1997, they
are unable, either individually or collectively, to provide a satisfactory general
explanation for the different results of the two referendums, either empirically or
theoretically. The claim that the Scotland Act 1978 was rejected because non-
Labour identifiers perceived it as Labour-biased is not confirmed by the pattern of
referendum voting by party identification. Although a significantly larger propor-
tion of Conservative than Labour identifiers voted No, Liberal identifiers displayed
a voting pattern not very different from Labour’s and Nationalist identifiers voted
overwhelmingly Yes (table 5).8 Nor is it consistent with the fact that a substantial
proportion of Labour identifiers themselves also voted No. Put another way, only
51 percent of those voters who, despite favouring devolution in principle, voted
No to the Scotland Act 1978 were Conservative identifiers (Dardanelli, 2002, 
p. 336). Moreover, the voting patterns of non-Labour identifiers were very similar
in the two referendums. This evidence is inconsistent with the claim that the 
Scotland Act 1978 was rejected because it was perceived as biased in favour of
Labour while the White Paper 1997 was not. Likewise, the hypothesis that
devolution did not get enough support in 1997 because it was associated with 
an unpopular government does not find support in the data. The fundamental
problem here is that the claim of Labour’s unpopularity derives from UK-wide
opinion surveys rather than data relative to Scottish opinion (Denver, Mitchell,
Pattie, Bochel, 2000, p. 159). As the 1979 general election results relative to
October 1974 indicate, Labour’s popularity increased in Scotland, with the party
gaining five percent in votes and three additional MPs. Moreover, attitudes towards
the Labour government – as proxied by support for Prime Minister Callaghan –
were not significantly correlated with the referendum vote and did not have an
independent impact on the latter (Table 16).
It is more difficult to validate or refute the hypothesis that devolution was rejected
in 1979 because of the fragmentation and lack of resources of the Yes campaign
and endorsed in 1997 on the strength of the Yes campaign. It is likely that the 
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relative strength of the campaigns had a significant influence on the outcomes.
However, this explanation misses the crucial point that, notwithstanding a decline
in support during the campaign in January and February 1979, support for self-
government was still above 60 percent at the time of the referendum (Table 3).
Like the previous one, this account thus fails to explain why a large proportion of
Scots who were theoretically in favour of devolution voted No and why almost
half of them did so despite identifying with parties supporting devolution.
Lastly, the ‘democratic deficit’ thesis itself does not fully stand up against the em-
pirical evidence. If we accept that support for devolution was higher in 1997 than
in 1979 as a result of the democratic deficit, we should expect four phenomena to
have occurred between 1979 and 1997: a sharp decline in satisfaction with the UK
government among non-Conservative identifiers, dissatisfaction with the UK gov-
ernment being a stronger determinant of demand for self-government in 1997 than
in 1979, a higher importance of self-government as a political issue and, most of
all, higher support for devolution itself. However, there is no evidence that these
phenomena occurred. First, the second sharpest decline in satisfaction with the 
UK government took place among Conservative identifiers while Nationalists 
were actually more satisfied in 1997 than in 1979 (Table 14). Secondly, trust in the
UK government was not an independent determinant of the demand for 
self-government in 1997 (Table 17). Thirdly, the perceived importance of self-
government as a political issue actually declined between 1979 and 1997 across all
groups of party identifiers (Tables 1 and 2). Lastly, but most importantly, support
for devolution fell from 54 to 43 percent (Tables 3 and 4).
In sum, though it is certainly true that the White Paper 1997 was a more consen-
sual document than the Scotland Act 1978, that the pro-self-government campaign
was more compact and better organised in 1997 than in 1979 and that there was
a distinct feeling of ‘democratic deficit’ at elite level in the 1990s,9 these factors do
not explain why the perceived importance of self-government at mass public level
did not increase, nor why support for devolution actually fell, let alone why a 
Scottish assembly was rejected in 1979 when 60 percent of voters favoured it in
principle.
Table 1: Importance of Self-government by Party Identification (column %) 1979
Q. When you were deciding about voting, how important was the general issue of
the form of government for Scotland?
Conservative Labour Liberal Nationalist All
Not important 44 37 30 9 36
Important 29 36 39 23 32
Extremely important 14 15 22 56 20
Don’t know 13 12 9 12 12
Note: the ‘important’ category here was labelled ‘fairly important’; for ease of comparability with 1997 I have rela-
belled it. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979.
Table 3: Support for Self-government by Party Identification (column %) 1979
Q. Here are a number of suggestions* which have been made about different 
ways of governing Scotland. Can you tell me which one comes closest  to your 
own view?
Conservative Labour Liberal Nationalist All
Status quo 40 20 25 5 26
Devolution 46 62 66 45 54
Assembly 29 31 33 9 28
Parliament 17 31 33 36 26
Independence 3 4 2 37 7
Self-government 49 66 67 82 61
Don’t know 11 14 8 13 13
N 222 274 67 75 729
Note: *No devolution or Scottish assembly of any sort; Have Scottish Committees of the House of Commons come
up to Scotland for their meetings; An elected Scottish assembly which would handle some Scottish affairs and would
be responsible to Parliament at Westminster; A Scottish Parliament which would handle most Scottish affairs, includ-
ing many economic affairs, leaving the Westminster Parliament responsible only for defence, foreign policy and inter-
national economic policy; A completely independent Scotland with a Scottish Parliament. I collapsed the first two
categories under the category ‘status quo’ as there is a wide consensus in referring to devolution as to the estab-
lishment of an elected body. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979.
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Table 2: Importance of Self-government by Party Identification (column %) 1997
Q. When you were deciding about voting in the general election, how important was
this issue – Scottish Parliament – to you? Was it ...
Conservative Labour Liberal Nationalist All
Not important 62 47 56 16 46
Important 26 36 34 39 33
Extremely important 8 15 8 41 16
Don’t know 4 2 2 4 4
Note: for ease of comparability with 1979, the ‘not important’ category here also includes the category ‘not at all
important’. Source: Scottish Election Survey 1997.
Table 4: Support for Self-government by Party Identification (column %) 1997
Q. Which of these statements* comes closest to your view ... Scotland should?
Conservative Labour Liberal Nationalist All
Status quo 61 7 35 2 19
Devolution 27 53 53 25 43
Parliament no tax 11 8 18 5 9
Parliament with tax 16 45 35 20 34
Independence 9 36 8 72 35
Independence in EU 8 26 8 54 26
Independence out EU 1 10 0 18 9
Self-government 36 89 61 89 78
Don’t know 2 4 4 9 3
N 123 336 51 122 676
Notes: *Scotland should remain part of the UK without an elected parliament; Scotland should remain part of the
UK, with its own elected parliament which has no taxation powers; Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its
own elected parliament which has some taxation powers; Scotland should become independent, separate from the
UK but part of the European Union; Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK and the European
Union. I collapsed the second and third categories into the category ‘devolution’ as they are not separately compa-
rable to the 1979 categories. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997.
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The Theoretical and Methodological Framework
The theoretical framework employed in this analysis has a general assumption and
four more substantive elements. The general assumption is of voters’ decisions
being guided by bounded rationality. In this context, voters are assumed to be inter-
ested in maximising their expected utility (in both material and ideational terms),
to rank their preferences accordingly, to select their actions on the basis of their
estimated probability that a given action will produce the intended outcome and
to do so under conditions of uncertainty (Kato, 1996). The substantive elements
are, first, the distinction between support for self-government as expressed in
opinion polls and the referendum vote. Second, the peculiar nature of voting
behaviour in referendums, defined in the literature as ‘referendum dynamic’.
Third, the specific dynamic identified in this case, that is, of the referendum vote
being determined by an ‘interaction effect’ between attitudes towards devolution
and attitudes towards independence. Lastly, the role played by perceptions of the
UK and the EU in shaping support for devolution and attitudes to independence.
I briefly discuss each of them.
Public Support and Referendum Vote
Referendum votes such as the Scottish ones are often held to gauge public support
for a given policy issue. As such support is usually estimated in the period leading
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up to the referendum through opinion polls, public opinion on the question tends
to be ‘well tracked’ prior to the vote. Nonetheless, not infrequently the referen-
dum result is at odds with public opinion as measured by surveys. For our pur-
poses here, we can thus think of the demand for self-government as conceptually
distinct between two variables. On the one hand, support for devolution or inde-
pendence as measured in opinion polls: on the other hand, the actual referendum
vote. We would normally expect the two variables to be highly correlated but sig-
nificant gaps between them can be present. The hypothesis here is that gaps
between the two are caused by voting dynamics that are more likely to be at play
in a referendum than in an election.
The Referendum Dynamic
Significant discrepancies between attitudinal support for a given issue, as measured
by opinion polls, and voting outcomes have been observed in several referendums.
The Irish divorce vote of 1986 and the Australian republic vote of 1999 are two
prominent cases in point (Darcy and Laver, 1990; Higley and McAllister, 2002).
Comparative study of these instances has generated a number of theoretical propo-
sitions about ‘voting dynamics’ in referendums as opposed to elections. The general
point is that in referendums voters often lack the simplifying ‘frame’ given by ideo-
logical stance and party identification. This opens up a potentially greater role for
campaigners to influence public opinion in directions that were unexpected shortly
before the start of the campaign. Two main kinds of ‘referendum dynamic’ have
been identified in the literature. The first is produced when campaigners are able
to manipulate public opinion by exploiting the fact that the issue put to the vote
is relatively new or previously had a low salience in public opinion and on which
party positions and ideological alignments are unclear. When two referendums are
held on the same issue at different points in time, we can expect this dynamic to
be distinctly stronger at the time of the first referendum. The second dynamic
occurs when new variables are introduced in the campaign leading to a ‘change of
the subject’ of the referendum, so that the latter is decided on issues that are dif-
ferent from the one put on the ballot paper. In this case the referendum outcome
can be very different from the distribution of opinions on the subject put to the
vote (Le Duc, 2002, especially pp. 713–17). As discussed in the following section,
there existed the potential for a form of ‘referendum dynamic’ in the Scottish votes
in the shape of an ‘interaction effect’ between attitudes to devolution and attitudes
to independence.
The ‘Interaction Effect’
The demand for self-government in Scotland was composed of two discrete ele-
ments: demand for devolution and demand for independence. The two elements
could be kept distinct at the level of opinion surveys but not at the level of refer-
endum vote, as independence was not an option in the referendums. Depending
on the shape of the preference order, one obtains different models of the interac-
tion between attitudes to devolution and attitudes to independence when trans-
lating support into an actual Yes vote. Let us consider these factors at the two points
in time, on the assumption outlined above that attitudes to devolution and to 
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independence were a function of the perceived utility of these constitutional sta-
tuses relative to the status quo. In 1979 supporters of devolution preferred it to
the status quo and the latter to independence, while supporters of independence
preferred it to devolution and the latter to the status quo.10 Supporters of the status
quo had devolution as second preference and independence as the third one. In
this case, the Yes vote is determined by the sum of support for independence plus
support for devolution discounted by the perceived probability that devolution
would lead to independence (Figure 1). Supporters of devolution would vote Yes
only in so far as they perceived that the risk deriving from devolution facilitating
independence would not outweigh the expected benefits associated with the
former. Their vote would thus be determined by two variables: attitudes to inde-
pendence and perceived probability that devolution would facilitate independence.
This leads to three predictions. First, the higher the perceived probability that devo-
lution would lead to independence, the higher the likelihood that the referendum
vote would in fact be determined by attitudes to independence. Second, the lower
the degree of self-government supported, the more negative the attitudes to inde-
pendence. Third, the more negative the attitudes to independence relative to 
the status quo and/or the higher the perceived probability that devolution would
facilitate independence, the more likely that support for devolution would not be
translated into a Yes vote. In contrast, in 1997 supporters of devolution had inde-
pendence as second preference and the status quo as third. This change in their
preference order effectively neutralised the interaction effect as they no longer
needed to assess whether devolution would be likely to lead to secession as both
outcomes were preferred to the status quo. The number of Yes votes would simply
Figure 1: Preferences and the Vote 1979
Preference order 
D > SQ > I = devolution preferred to status quo and status quo preferred to 
independence
I > D > SQ = independence preferred to devolution and devolution preferred  
to status quo 
SQ > D > I = status quo preferred to devolution and devolution preferred to 
independence
Interaction effect
Rv = Si + (1 – p)Sd  
Referendum   vote   equal   to   support   for   independence   plus   support   for 
devolution discounted by the perceived probability that devolution would lead 
to independence
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be the sum of supporters of devolution and supporters of independence with no
distorting ‘interaction effect’.
The Intra-State and Extra-State Dimensions
As the demand for self-government included significant support for independence
and the latter crucially influenced the referendum vote via the interaction effect,
I hypothesise that the referendum vote was determined not only by attitudes to
the UK but also by attitudes to the international environment. The latter, as dis-
cussed in the first section, is neglected in the existing literature. Because of the
strategic use of ‘Europe’ made by the Scottish National Party (SNP), and the avail-
ability of survey data, I utilise attitudes towards the European Union as a proxy
for attitudes to the international environment. I thus argue that the perceived costs
of secession were primarily determined by the perception of the European envi-
ronment, bearing in mind that Scotland’s status as a nation and the ‘union’ nature
of the British state meant that Scotland had always enjoyed an ‘implicit’ right to
secede from the United Kingdom (Kellas, 1999, p. 224). The impact of the Euro-
pean dimension can thus be measured by two variables. First, whether voters
demanding self-government for Scotland had a positive or negative perception of
the European Union and, second, whether an independent Scotland would be part
of the EU or not. As discussed below, both these variables varied between the first
and second referendum. I hypothesise that a rejection of the European dimension
– as defined by negative attitudes towards the EU and the placing of an indepen-
dent Scotland outside it – reduced the proportion of voters supporting secession
while embrace of it led to more voters favouring independence.
Figure 2: Preferences and the Vote 1997
Preference order 
D > I > SQ = devolution   preferred   to   independence   and   independence  
preferred to status quo
I > D > SQ = independence preferred to devolution and devolution preferred  
to status quo
SQ > D > I = status quo preferred to devolution and devolution preferred to 
independence
Interaction effect
Rv = Si + Sd 
Referendum vote equal to the sum of support for independence and support for 
devolution 
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Methods and Data
The analysis is based on a comparison of public opinion at the time of the two ref-
erendums in 1979 and 1997. The dependent variable is the referendum vote while
the main independent variables employed are support for self-government, atti-
tudes towards independence, importance of self-government as a political issue in
the 1979 and 1997 general elections, attitudes towards the UK political system and
attitudes towards the EU. The main control variable is party identification. These
variables are analysed through comparison between descriptive statistics and
through logistic regression models of voting in the two referendums. Two regres-
sion models for each referendum are presented. In each case, the first is a fully
specified model testing the impact of up to 11 independent variables – those for
which there are good theoretical reasons to expect a meaningful association – while
the second model includes only those variables proved significant in the first model
so as to maximise explanatory power in the most parsimonious way possible. 
The raw data are provided by the Scottish Election Study 1979 and 1997 and the
Scottish Referendum Study 1997, which are the most comprehensive data sets
available on Scottish public opinion at the two points in time.11 I have tried to 
use the most comparable measures, though some questions vary from one study
to the other. I used responses to the survey question on whether and how the
interviewee voted in the referendums as a proxy for actual voting behaviour.
Results
This part presents results of the analysis of the connections between the demand
for self-government, attitudes towards the UK and attitudes towards the EU at the
two points in time. The results show that the variables that most dramatically
changed between 1979 and 1997 were those related to support for independence
and attitudes towards the EU while most other measures changed much less 
significantly or not at all.
The Demand for Self-Government
On the basis of its saliency as a political issue in the general elections, self-
government was less important to Scottish voters in 1997 than it was in 1979.
Moreover, the perceived importance of devolution declined across the board,
regardless of party identification (Tables 1 and 2). Support for self-government was
higher and more clearly defined at the time of the second referendum. It rose from
61 to 78 percent while preferences for the status quo dropped from 26 to 19 percent
with ‘don’t knows’ declining from 13 to three percent. However, this overall rise
in support was a combination of two opposite trends. While support for devolu-
tion declined from 54 to 43 percent, support for independence increased five-fold
from seven to 35 percent. This dramatic increase was almost entirely due to the
popularity of the new ‘independence in the EU’ option, not available in 1979,
which became the second most preferred constitutional option with 26 percent
support. Not only did independence in Europe become the majority preference
among Nationalist identifiers but it also attracted a substantial 26 percent of 
Labour identifiers while in 1979 independence was not even the first choice of
Table 5: Referendum Vote by Party Identification (column %) 1979
Q. Did you vote in the recent referendum on Devolution for Scotland? If Yes did you
vote ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. If no did you favour the ‘Yes’ side or the ‘No’ side?
Conservative Labour Liberal Nationalist All
Voted No 56 24 36 3 33
Didn’t vote, favoured No 12 12 15 4 11
(Total No) (68) (36) (51) (7) (44)
Didn’t vote, no pref. 4 8 5 4 6
Voted Yes 15 39 31 69 33
Didn’t vote, favoured Yes 13 7 6 11 6
(Total Yes) (28) (46) (37) (80) (39)
Don’t know/na 10 11 7 9 11
N 222 274 67 75 729
Source: Scottish Election Study 1979.
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Nationalist identifiers. This compares to an increase of only two points in support
for the option of independence outside the EU.12 These data indicate that the higher
overall support for self-government in 1997 was entirely due to the rise in popu-
larity of independence rather than to greater support for devolution. One could go
even further and say that, essentially, demand for self-government was raised by
the availability of the ‘independence in Europe’ option that was not offered in 1979
(Tables 3 and 4).
The higher level of demand for self-government in 1997 relative to 1979 was most
starkly in display in the results of the two referendums. The Yes vote increased by
more than 20 points while the No vote declined by 15 percentage points. More-
over, those who did not vote in 1979 were almost twice as likely to favour the No
side than the Yes side. This seems to indicate that a substantial proportion of the
electorate abstained in the knowledge that – under the ‘40 percent rule’ – their
abstention would favour the No side. It is reasonable to assume that without the
rule the referendum result would have been negative as negative was overall public
opinion about the Scotland Act 1978. The change in the referendum vote was thus
much stronger than the change that took place at the level of opinion poll support.
The data disaggregated by party identification show that the voting patterns of Con-
servative, Nationalists and, to a lesser extent, Liberal identifiers stayed remarkably
stable between 1979 and 1997 while a sharp ‘swing’ took place among Labour
identifiers. The latter’s Yes vote increased by 27 percentage points while the No
vote dropped by 17 points (Tables 5 and 6).13
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Support/Vote Gap and Interaction Effect
The crucial difference between 1979 and 1997 was thus in the size of the gap
between support for self-government and the number of Yes votes. In 1979 the
gap was large enough to turn a support for self-government of over 60 percent
into a rejection of devolution in the referendum whereas it was actually negative
in 1997: across all party identifications the percentage of No votes was no greater
than that of status quo supporters. Crucially, moreover, only seven percent 
of supporters of devolution voted No in the referendum while eighteen years 
before 28 percent did so. Furthermore, if we include those who did not vote 
but had a preference in the analysis, in 1979 almost 40 percent of supporters of
devolution favoured a No vote. In other words, those who were in favour of 
devolution voted overwhelmingly Yes in the second referendum. The change in
the voting pattern of supporters of devolution was clearly the decisive factor 
as those supporting independence voted as strongly in favour of the White 
Paper 1997 as they did in favour of the Scotland Act 1978 (Table 7). Responses 
to the questions about the main disadvantage of devolution indicate that voters
consistently perceived, in 1997 as in 1979, that devolution was highly likely to 
lead to independence (Tables 8, 9 and 10). This explains why secessionists 
voted strongly in favour of devolution in both referendums. Among supporters 
of devolution, and those in favour of the assembly option in particular, the 
crucial difference was that a majority preferred the status quo to independence 
in 1979 while independence was their second constitutional preference in 
1997 (Tables 12 and 13). The existence of an independence/devolution interaction
effect is further underlined by the fact that fear of secession was a strong inde-
pendent determinant of a No vote in 1979. Those who were ‘very much against’
independence were much more likely to have voted No than those just ‘against’
it, let alone those who favoured or strongly favoured it. Likewise, the perception
of a ‘break up of the UK’ as the main disadvantage of devolution was a 
significantly more powerful determinant of a No vote than other perceptions 
(Table 16).
Table 6: Referendum Vote by Party Identification (column %) 1997
Q. How did you vote on the first question*?
Conservative Labour Liberal Nationalist All
Voted No 58 7 31 1 18
Didn’t vote 25 26 22 20 26
Voted Yes 15 66 47 78 55
Don’t know/na 2 1 0 1 1
N 123 336 51 122 676
Note: *Should there be a Scottish parliament in the UK? Source: Scottish Referendum Study 1997.
Table 8: Most Important Disadvantage of Devolution by Constitutional
Preference (column %) 1979
Q. Which one of these is the most important disadvantage of devolution?
Status quo Assembly Parliament Indep All
Break up UK 38 37 23 16 27
Cost of bureaucracy 25 22 25 28 22
Too many levels of govt 16 18 16 16 15
Benefits wrong 5 10 11 8 8
Harm economy 9 6 4 2 5
Loss UK voice 4 6 6 10 5
Others/don’t know 3 1 15 20 18
Note: N = 729. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979.
Table 7: Referendum Vote of Supporters of Self-government (column %)
1979/1997
1979: Did you vote in the recent referendum on Devolution for Scotland? If Yes did
you vote ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ | If no did you favour the ‘Yes’ side or the ‘No’ side?
1997: How did you vote on the first question*?
Self-
Independence Devolution government
1979 1997 1979 1997 1979 1997
Voted Yes 68 75 46 65 49 70
Didn’t vote favoured Yes 12 – 8 – 8 –
(Total Yes) (80) (75) (51) (65) (57) (70)
Didn’t vote no preference 8 23 7 28 7 25
Didn’t vote favoured No 2 – 11 – 10 –
Voted No 10 2 28 7 26 5
(Total No) (12) (2) (39) (7) (36) (5)
N 50 232 394 289 444 521
Note: *Should there be a Scottish parliament in the UK? Sources: Scottish Election Study 1979, Scottish Referen-
dum Study 1997.
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Table 10: Parliament’s Most Important Thing Not to do by Vote in the Referendum
(column %) 1997
Q. This card shows a few things a Scottish parliament might want to bring about ...
And which, if any, should a Scottish parliament not try to bring about? 
IF SEVERAL MENTIONED: Which is the most important?
Voted Yes Voted No All
Leave UK more likely 47 85 56
Stronger voice in UK 3 1 2
Stronger voice in EU 1 1 1
More pride in country 1 2 1
Increase standard of living 1 0 1
None of these 32 5 25
Others/Don’t know 15 6 14
Note: N = 676. Source: Scottish Referendum Study 1997.
Table 9: Most Important Disadvantage of Devolution by Vote in the Referendum
(column %) 1979
Q. Which one of these is the most important disadvantage of devolution?
Voted Yes Voted No
Self-gov* Assembly** Self-gov* Assembly**
Break up UK 22 26 37 44
Cost of bureaucracy 27 28 26 19
Too many levels of govt 16 18 19 19
Benefits wrong 11 10 8 8
Harm economy 4 8 1 1
Loss UK voice 9 9 4 4
Others/don’t know 11 1 5 5
Note: *sub-sample of supporters of the three self-government options: assembly, parliament, independence, 
N = 444; **sub-sample of supporters of the assembly option only, N = 205. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979.
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Table 11: Attitudes to Independence by Party Identification (column %) 1979
Q. For each suggestion* on the card, could you say whether you are very much in
favour, somewhat  in favour, somewhat  against or very much against that
suggestion?
Conservative Labour Liberal Nationalist All
Very much against 71 54 69 9 56
Somewhat against 11 17 18 13 15
Somewhat in favour 3 9 1 16 6
Very much in favour 2 7 3 49 9
Don’t know/n.a. 13 13 9 12 13
N 222 274 67 75 729
Note: in this case: ‘a completely independent Scotland with a Scottish Parliament’. Source: Scottish Election Study
1979.
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Table 12: Indices of Attitudes to the Status Quo and to Independence Among
Supporters of Devolution 1979
Q. For each suggestion† on the card, could you say whether you are very much in
favour, somewhat in favour, somewhat against or very much against that
suggestion?
Assembly Parliament Devolution
Status quo 1** -91 -110 -100
Status quo 2** 17 -30 -3
Independence -163 -87 -126
Note: N = 394; †see note at Table 3; indices referred to in the title vary from -200 = 100% of respondents were ‘very
much against’ and +200 = 100% of respondents were ‘very much in favour’; **there were two options which largely
amounted to maintaining the status quo in the 1979 survey, see note at Table 3. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979.
Attitudes Towards the UK and the EU
I use three variables to measure attitudes towards the UK political system in 
Scotland in 1979 and 1997: satisfaction with government, perception of Scotland’s
welfare vis-à-vis the rest of the UK and identification with the UK. They are
intended to estimate support for the UK system in its politico-institutional, eco-
nomic and ‘affective’ aspects, respectively. As only one variable relative to attitudes
to the EU is available for the first referendum, I use a generic measure of support
for the EU for both 1979 and 1997.
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The three UK variables moved in different directions between the two points in
time. Satisfaction with government was, overall, positive in 1979 and became
slightly negative in 1997. In contrast, perceptions of Scotland’s welfare improved
markedly, though were still negative at the latter point in time. Primary identifi-
cation with the UK was already negative in 1979 and became more so in 1997.
Hence, at the time of the second referendum attitudes towards the UK were neg-
ative across the three measures.
Disaggregating by party identification, Conservative identifiers are an outlier group
but only marginally so. Though their satisfaction with government was positive in
1997, it was significantly less so than eighteen years before. They were also the
only group thinking that Scotland was better off than the rest of the UK in 1997
but, somewhat more surprisingly, they primarily identified with Scotland rather
than the UK as a whole at the latter point in time. At the opposite end of the spec-
trum, Nationalist identifiers were consistently negative across variables and over
time, but their dissatisfaction with the UK government was much less deep in 1997
than in 1979 (Table 14). Across the three measures, support for the UK system was
negatively correlated with support for self-government both in 1979 and in 1997,
though, with the exception of national identity in 1997, its measures were not
independent determinants of the referendum vote, either in 1979 or in 1997
(Tables 16 and 17).
Attitudes towards the EU evolved in the opposite direction to those towards the
UK. Support for membership was, overall, negative in 1979 and was solidly posi-
tive in 1997. At the first point in time, there was a split in perceptions between
Conservative and Liberal identifiers on the one hand – with positive attitudes –
and Labour and, especially, Nationalist identifiers on the other hand, who were
hostile. At the time of the second referendum, in contrast, all groups of party 
Table 13: The Second Preferences of Supporters of Devolution by Party
Identification (column %) 1997
Q. And which would be
your second preference? Conservative Labour Liberal Nationalist All
Independence 15 31 40 33 30
Independence outside EU 0 6 8 4 5
Independence within EU 15 25 32 29 25
Other devolution option* 46 32 24 50 34
Status quo 27 16 12 0 17
Don’t know/no answer 12 21 24 17 20
N 33 168 25 24 289
Note: *with tax-raising powers and vice-versa. Source: Scottish Referendum Study 1997.
Table 14: Indices of Support for the UK in 1979 and 1997
1979 1997 Change
Satisfaction with UK government* 40 -1 -41
Conservative party ID – Con ID 87 41 -46
Conservative party ID – Lab ID 26 -4 -30
Labour party ID – Lib ID 46 -14 -60
Labour party ID – Nat ID -45 -24 +21
Perception of Scotland’s welfare** -66 -28 +38
Liberal Democrat party ID – Con ID -55 3 +58
Liberal Democrat party ID – Lab ID -71 -37 +34
Liberal Democrat party ID – Lib ID -65 -25 +40
Liberal Democrat party ID – Nat ID -78 -39 +39
Identification with the UK*** -16 -58 -42
Nationalist party ID – Con ID 3 -21 -24
Nationalist party ID – Lab ID -22 -66 -44
Nationalist party ID – Lib ID -12 -23 -11
Nationalist party ID – Nat ID -68 -83 -15
Note: Satisfaction with government: 1979: How many marks out of ten would you give the following ... the West-
minster parliament? 1997: Which of these statements best describes your opinion on the present system of govern-
ing Britain? Responses were: Works extremely well and could not be improved; Could be improved in small ways but
mainly works well; could be improved quite a lot; needs a great deal of improvement. For the sake of comparability
I re-grouped the 1979 categories into four categories on the basis of the following conversion: 9, 10 = works extremely
well; 6, 7, 8 = could be improved in small ways; 3, 4, 5 = could be improved quite a lot; 0, 1, 2 = needs a great deal
of improvement;
Perception of Scotland’s welfare: 1979: Compared with other parts of Britain, would do you say that Scotland was
better off or not so well off? 1997: Compared with other parts of Britain, would you say that these days Scotland is
better off, not so well off or just about the same?
Identification with the UK: 1979: Do you consider yourself to be British or Scottish or English or Irish or something
else? If you had to choose, which would you say you were? 1997: Which, if any, of the following‡ best describes how
you see yourself? Options were: Scottish, not British; Scottish more than British; Equally Scottish and British; British
more than Scottish; British not Scottish: I collapsed the first two categories into a primary identification with Scot-
land and the latter into a primary identification with the UK. *index varies between -200 = all respondents were very
dissatisfied and +200 = all respondents were very satisfied, 1997 data are relative to General Election; **index varies
between -100 = 100% of respondents thought Scotland was worse off than the rest of the UK and +100 = 100% of
respondents thought Scotland was better off, 1997 data relative to Referendum; ***index varies between -100 =
primary identification with Scotland and +100 = primary identification with the UK, 1997 data relative to Referendum.
Sources: Scottish Election Study 1979, Scottish Election Survey 1997 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997.
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identifiers displayed positive attitudes with only minor variations between them.
Nationalist identifiers made the most spectacular turnaround in attitudes, from
being by far the most hostile to being the second most positive (Table 15).14 In 
contrast to attitudes to the UK, support for the EU was thus in negative correla-
tion with support for self-government in 1979 while the reverse was true for 
1997. However, as with attitudes to the UK, support for the EU was not an inde-
pendent determinant of the referendum vote, either in 1979 or in 1997 (Tables 16
and 17).
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Conclusions
These results provide empirical support for the hypotheses advanced in the second
section. In particular, they substantiate four key claims. First, there was a large gap
between support for self-government and the referendum vote in 1979 whereas
the gap was minimal in 1997. The large size of the 1979 gap accounts for the rejec-
tion of the Scotland Act 1978 despite self-government still attracting 60 percent
support. Second, at both points in time the referendum vote was intimately linked
to attitudes to independence as devolution was perceived as likely to lead to seces-
sion. However, devolutionists preferred, crucially, the status quo to independence
in 1979 and vice versa in 1997. More particularly, those devolutionists who voted
No in 1979 were very strongly opposed to independence and fear of secession was
as strong a determinant of the No vote as partisanship. This explains the variation
in the size of the support/vote gap and, ultimately, the different results of the two
referendums. Third, independence was preferred to the status quo in 1997 because
it was ‘in Europe’. The dramatic rise in support for independence was almost exclu-
sively due to the change of strategy by the SNP and its embrace of the EU.15 This
was reflected in the change in the perception of the European Union among devo-
lutionists, from deeply negative to strongly positive. The extra-state dimension thus
had a crucial impact on the variation in the demand for self-government between
the first and the second referendum. However, its impact was not direct – hence
it is not captured statistically in the logistic regressions – but was mediated by the
strategic use made of it by elite actors. Fourth, as discussed more extensively else-
where (Dardanelli, 2005), the failure by the Yes campaign to exploit the European
dimension to their advantage in 1979 opened the way for their opponents to
‘change the subject’ of the campaign and turn it into a choice between the status
quo and secession. This produced a ‘referendum dynamic’ that turned majority
support for devolution into a rejection of the Scotland Act 1978. That strategic
mistake was not repeated in 1997 and no distorting ‘referendum dynamic’ was
Table 15: Indices of Support for the EU 1979/1997
1979: How many marks out of ten would you give the following ... the Common
Market? 1997: On the whole, do you think the European Union has been ...?
Conservative Labour Liberal Nationalist All
1979 14 -21 3 -43 -10
1997 30 30 41 35 32
Change +16 +51 +38 +78 +42
Note: The index varies between -100 when all of respondents think membership of the EU is bad for Scotland and
+100 when all of respondents think membership of the EU is good for Scotland. For the sake of comparability, I re-
grouped the 1979 categories into three categories on the basis of the following conversion: 7, 8, 9, 10 = good for
Scotland; 4, 5, 6 = neither good nor bad; 0, 1, 2, 3 = bad for Scotland. Sources: Scottish General Election Study 1979
and Scottish Referendum Study 1997.
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Table 16: Logistic Regression Models of No Voting in the 1979 Referendum
Model 1 Model 2




Constitutional preferences (base: assembly)
Status quo 2.066*** 1.851***
Parliament -0.840* -0.822**
Independence 2.566 3.060
Attitudes to independence (base: against)
Very much against 1.334*** 1.325***
Favour -0.218 -0.276
Very much favour -2.632 -3.397*
Disadvantage of devolution (base: other/don’t know)
Too many levels of government 0.654 0.657
More bureaucracy 0.813* 0.696*
Break up of the UK 0.994** 0.947**
Scotland’s welfare (base: same)
Better off than the rest of the UK -0.985
Not so well off as the rest of the UK -0.753















National identity (base: Scottish)
British 0.132
Religion (base: Church of Scotland)
Roman Catholic 0.497
Constant -2.642 -2.039
-2 log likelihood 384.360 409.945
Pseudo-r2 (Nagelkerke) 0.596 0.556
Percentage correctly predicted 80.6 80.2
Note: the ‘don’t know’ categories were included in the analysis but results are not reported here for the sake of
brevity; † I re-grouped the original ten categories into four categories on the basis of the following conversion: 9, 10
= very good; 6, 7, 8 = good; 3, 4, 5 = bad; 0, 1, 2 = very bad. ***significant at p < 0.001; **significant at p < 0.01; *sig-
nificant at p < 0.05. Interaction effects among the explanatory variables were tested for and found not significant,
the results are not reported here but are available from the author.
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Table 17: Logistic Regression Models of Yes Voting in the 1997 Referendum
Model 1 Model 2
Party identification (base: Conservative)
Labour 2.554** 2.793***
Liberal Democrat 2.845** 2.765**
Nationalist 4.587** 4.576**
Constitutional preferences (base: status quo)
Parliament, no tax-raising 4.977*** 4.627***
Parliament, tax-raising 6.088*** 5.581***
Independence in the EU 6.284*** 5.884***
Independence outside the EU 6.141*** 5.530***
Scotland’s welfare (base: not so well off)
As well off as the rest of the UK 0.364
Better off than the rest of the UK -0.108





Trust in the UK government (base: almost never)
Some of the time -1.606
Most of the time -1.035
Just about always -1.800






National identity† (base: British)
Scottish 1.117Ÿ 0.874Ÿ
Religion (base: none/other/don’t know)
Roman Catholic 1.502
Church of Scotland -0.15
Constant -3.528 -5.379
-2 log likelihood 127.591 151.588
Pseudo-r2 (Nagelkerke) 0.839 0.816
Percentage correctly predicted 95.4 94.9
Note: ***significant at p < 0.001; **significant at p < 0.01; *significant at p < 0.05; Ÿsignificant at p < 0.10; †for the
sake of comparability with 1979, I re-grouped the original five categories into two categories as follows: British not
Scottish = British; British more than Scottish = British; Equally British and Scottish = British; More Scottish than
British = Scottish; Scottish not British = Scottish. Interaction effects among the explanatory variables were tested
for and found not significant, the results are not reported here but are available from the author.
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generated. The ‘cleaner’ nature of the second referendum also emerges from the
logistic regression where a very parsimonious three-variable model is able to cor-
rectly predict 95 percent of the cases in the dependent variable while a similar
model for 1979 predicts only 80 percent of them.16 The model presented here is
thus able to explain both why devolution was rejected in 1979 despite 60 percent
support for it and why it was endorsed in 1997 despite the previous rejection. It
shows that attitudes to independence were a crucial variable of the referendum
vote and that the European dimension, as exploited by elite political actors, had a
deep impact on these attitudes.
These findings also speak to the wider literature on referendum voting and provide
additional empirical support for the concept of ‘referendum dynamic’, whereby
elite strategies in referendum campaigns have the ability to ‘change the subject’ of
referendums and manipulate public opinion to the extent that referendums may
produce outcomes at odds with public opinion on the matter put to the vote.
(Accepted: 10 January 2005)
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van Houten and the three journal referees for their very helpful comments on previous versions. Special
thanks to Thomas Saalfeld and Martin Ridout for their precious help.
1 Given space constraints, it is not possible to give the reader a full background to the Scottish devo-
lution referendums here. See Bogdanor (1999) for an excellent introduction.
2 The first ever opinion poll in 1947 registered 76 percent support for a Scottish parliament (Mitchell,
1996, pp. 309–10) while 74 percent voted Yes to a Scottish parliament fifty years later.
3 Although the 1979 referendum result was narrowly in favour – 51.6 to 48.5 percent – taking into
account those who did not vote but had a preference and the incentives for strategic abstention
induced by the ‘40 percent rule’, the majority of the Scottish electorate rejected the Scotland Act
1978 (Table 5). The 40 percent rule stipulated that the Scotland Act 1978 would be implemented if
at least 40 percent of the Scottish electorate voted in favour, whereas only 33 percent did so.
4 Watt (1979, p. 146); Bochel and Denver (1981, p. 144); Butler and McLean (1999, p. 7); Kellas (1999,
p. 225) emphasise the unpopularity of the Labour party; Perman (1979, p. 54); Mitchell (1996, 
pp. 163–4); Mitchell, Denver, Pattie and Bochel (1998, p. 167) and Denver, Mitchell, Pattie and
Bochel (2000, p. 19) stress the divisions and the contradictions within the Yes campaign.
5 See Jones, 1997, pp. 3–4; Mitchell, Denver, Pattie and Bochel, 1998, p. 168; Pattie, Denver, Mitchell
and Bochel, 1998, pp. 14–15; Pattie, Denver, Mitchell and Bochel, 1999a, pp. 141–2; Denver, Mitchell,
Pattie and Bochel, 2000, pp. 49, 75–6.
6 See Mitchell, Denver, Pattie and Bochel, 1998, p. 178; Pattie, Denver, Mitchell and Bochel, 1998, 
p. 14; Pattie, Denver, Mitchell and Bochel, 1999a, p. 140; Denver, Mitchell, Pattie and Bochel, 2000, 
p. 169; Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 1998, p. 62; Taylor, 1999, pp. xxxix–xl; Surridge and McCrone,
1999, p. 440; Paterson and Wyn Jones, 1999, pp. 179–80; Kellas, 1999, p. 223.
7 Denver, Mitchell, Pattie and Bochel (2000, pp. 28–32) emphasise the former while Surridge and
McCrone (1999, p. 44); Paterson, Brown and McCrone (1992, p. 634) and Paterson and Wyn Jones
(1999) emphasise the latter.
8 While these differences may be interpreted as being primarily determined by partisanship, they are
also consistent with the fact that Conservative and Liberal identifiers were more strongly opposed to
independence than Labour ones (Table 11).
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9 As one of the journal referees pointed out, other actors such as local governments and some profes-
sional associations also switched from hostility to support for devolution between 1979 and 1997.
However, their change of position did not increase as such mass support for devolution which, as
mentioned, fell between the two points in time. I am nonetheless grateful to him or her for point-
ing this out to me.
10 Supporters of independence preferred devolution to the status quo because they perceived the former
to be more likely to facilitate secession.
11 As no referendum study was conducted in 1979, the data on the first referendum came from the
election study conducted from May to October 1979. They thus reflect public opinion some months
after the referendum took place. The possibility that some changes might have occurred, and thus
that the data might not faithfully reflect public opinion at time of the referendum, should be borne
in mind. However, the close mirroring of the actual referendum results seems to indicate that the
data have a high level of validity and no better data are available. Likewise, the data from the 1997
election study were collected between May and July 1997 so they reflect public opinion some months
before the 1997 referendum.
12 On the basis of the then SNP position, the ‘independence’ option in 1979 was equivalent to the ‘inde-
pendence outside the EU’ option in 1997.
13 The impact of these changes in voting patterns on the referendum outcome was, of course, ampli-
fied by the changes in the structure of party identification among the electorate, see Dardanelli (2002,
p. 352).
14 Additional data only available for 1997, not shown here but reported elsewhere (Dardanelli, 2002,
p. 351), indicate that, with the exception of Conservative identifiers, there was also support for the
‘social dimension’ of the EU’s policy output, as symbolised by the Social Charter, while there was
very little identification with Europe, across all party identifications. The difference between variables
at the time of the second referendum shows that voters had a fairly sophisticated perception of the
EU and were clearly able to discriminate between its different aspects.
15 Other factors may also have contributed to the higher popularity of independence, for example 
the birth of several new countries out of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the
improved security environment following the end of the Cold War but these effects are not directly
testable on the available data so must remain hypothetical. For a wider discussion, see Dardanelli
(2005).
16 Although they worked on a different dataset, Pattie, Denver, Mitchell and Bochel (1999b, p. 319)
arrive at a similar conclusion.
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